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INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
par. 1061. It is clear that under the statutes as interpreted, the judgment
plaintiff may renew his action ad infinitum upon each successive judgment
thus recovered, provided the action is brought anytime within the 20 year
period of limitation, since any other construction would nullify the statutes. The statute of limitations begins to run upon a judgment only when
it is final and enforceable by action, which is normally when it becomes
effective by rendition and entry; Sweetser v. Fox, 43 Utah 40, Ann. Cas.
1916C 620; (and other cases there cited) and in the absence of a statute,
if an action is begun within the statutory period, a new judgment obtained thereon would be effective and actionable for another period of equal
length. In some states, even after the 20 year period has run, the judgment may be revived by a part payment or new promise, since contracts
may be revived in this manner, and such states hold that judgments are
contracts. The case of Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174, holds with the
weight of authority that a judgment is not a contract (authorities pro
and con cited in 8 L. R. A. [N. S.] 444) although Odell v. Green, 122 N. E.
791, 72 Ind. App. 65, holds that in no event does a statute of limitations
utterly destroy a judgment, and if the limitation be not pleaded it is
waived, whereupon the judgment which is the foundation of the action,
although over 20 years old, will sustain a new judgment, while if the
limitation is pleaded and the action thereby barred, yet the old judgment
will be a sufficient consideration for a new promise The latter case is in
conflict with section 86, subsection 1, of the American Law Institute's restatement of the law of Contracts, and is clearly unsupported by the weight
K. J. M.
of authority.
STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL PROMISE To ANSWER FOR THE DEBT OF ANOTHER-CONSTRUCTION OF "ASSUME AND AGREE TO PAY . . ."-The defendant contracted with state to build a road; and with a gravel firm to
furnish defendant with gravel for the project. The gravel firm became
involved with its creditors, whereupon the gravel firm and the defendant
called a meeting of creditors, at which the affairs of gravel firm were
placed in hands of a creditors-committee, who were to carry out the contract to furnish defendant with gravel. The defendant orally agreed at
this meeting to pay all persons and laborers engaged in delivering gravel.
On suit to enforce defendant's promise, defendant pleaded the statute of
frauds (Section 8045 of '26 Burns); that his promise was a promise to
answer "for the debt of another." Held: The defendant is liable for all
laborers engaged in delivering gravel, since when the gravel firm failed
and the creditors took charge they did so for the benefit of all parties, and
from then on all parties continued to work for the defendant, and therefore the promise of defendant was not a promise to answer for the debt
of another, but to answer for his own debt. Davis Construction Company
v. Petty, Appellate Court of Indiana, Nov. 18, 1929, 168 N. E. 769.
The authorities in accord are many. Edwards v. Van Cleave, 94 N. E.
596; Miller v. State, 35 Ind. App. 379, 74 N. E. 260; Gibson County v. Cincinnati Steam Heating Company, 128 Ind. 240, 27 N. E. 612, 12 L. R. A.
502.
And on principle the case is sound. The federal rule has generally
been stated to be "Where the main purpose of the new arrangement is to
subserve the interest of th6 new promisor, the agreement is not within
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the statute." Emerson v. Slater, 22 Howard 28; Davis v. Patrick, 141
U. S. 479. It has been stated that under the statute the real question as
to whether the new promisor is liable or not should be the question of
whether the new promise can be said to be one creating an obligation in
him independently of whether the original obligor is still liable, so that
the new promisor comes under an independent duty of payment irrespective of the duty of the original obligor; or whether it is a promise to
answer for the debt of another. Whether the consideration comes from
the original obligor to the new promisor should only be evidence, more or
less strong, as to whether a new and independent obligation has been
created. Arnold, Suretyship and Guaranty Sec. 60; 27 C. J. 160. Willis:
The Statute of Frauds: A Legal Anachronism, 3 Indiana L. J. 427.
But it is difficult to reconcile the rationale of this Petty Case with
Harvey v. Lowry, 152 N. E. 839 (1926). There a judgment debtor had
conveyed land subject to the judgment, and a deed to a remote grantee
provided that the grantee assumed and agreed to pay the judgment as
part of the purchase price. The court by implication stated that the act
of acceptance of such deed of assumption was not an agreement on the
part of the grantee to pay the judgment. No case is cited. "The acceptance of a deed, whether poll or inter parties, containing a covenant
on the part of the grantee is equivalent to an agreement on his part to
perform the same and it is immaterial that the deed is not signed by him."
16 C. J. 1211, citing many an Indiana case. Section 388 of Tiffany on
Real Property is to the same effect, citing Co. Lit, 230 C. Butler's note;
Shepard's Touchstone, 177 and cases. The court stated by dictum: "even
if the grantee by the provision in the deed had agreed to pay the judgment and such agreement had been made for the judgment debtor's benefit, the agreement not being signed by the grantee was within the statute
of frauds prohibiting an action on a promise to answer for the debt of
another, unless the same or some memorandum thereof is in writing and
signed by the party to be charged." The court cites no cases on this point.
The principle in the Lowry case seems not essentially different from
that in the Petty case. Both are instances where heretofore the cases had
seemed uniform that the assumption of the debt was the creation of a new
and independent obligation on the part of the one who assumes by reason
of the fact that he "serves his own interest," thus taking the case out of
the statute. The rule is stated to be that an oral promise by the purchaser of lands subject to a mortgage or other incumbrances to assume
and pay off the incumbrances as part of purchase price is not within the
statute. 27 C. J. 163. Lowe v. Hamilton, 31 N. E. 1117, 132 Ind. 406;
Gregory v. Arms, 48 Ind. App. 562, 96 N E. 196; Lowe v Turpie, 147 Ind.
652, 44 N. E. 25, 36 L. R. A. 233; Berkshire v. Young, 45 Ind, 461; McDill
v. Gunn, 43 Ind. 315; Helm v. Kearns, 40 Ind. 124; Southern Ind. Loan, etc.,
v. Roberts, 42 Ind. App. 653, 86 N. E. 490.
It would seem that on principle the dictum of the Lowry case is unJ. V. H.
sound
WILLS-CLASSES OF LEGAcms--The testator died leaving a will with the
following clause: "I bequeath to my daughter, Mabel L. Waters, Salt Lake
City, Utah, or to her heirs, if she shall die before me, five thousand (5000)
dollars cash out of the Burbank estate, Pittsburgh, Pa." The widow, step-

